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A new paradigm for secure communication, based on quantum illumination, is proposed. Alice
uses spontaneous parametric down-conversion to send Bob a set of signal modes over a pure-loss
channel while retaining the set of idler modes with which they are maximally entangled. Bob
imposes a single information bit on the modes he receives from Alice via binary phase-shift keying.
He then adds classical Gaussian noise and sends the noisy modulated modes back to Alice over
the same pure-loss channel. Even though the loss and noise destroy any entanglement between the
modes that Alice receives from Bob and the idler modes she has retained, she can decode Bob’s bit
with an error probability that can be orders of magnitude lower than what is achieved by a passive
eavesdropper who receives all the photons that are lost en route from Alice to Bob and from Bob
to Alice.
PACS numbers: 42.50.Dv, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn
The use of quantum key distribution (QKD) to en-
sure the security of classical information transmission has
moved from its theoretical roots [1, 2, 3] to a major net-
work demonstration [4]. The objective of QKD is for two
geographically separated users—Alice and Bob—to cre-
ate a shared set of completely random key bits in manner
that precludes an eavesdropper (Eve) from having any-
thing more than an inconsequentially small amount of
information about the entire set of key bits. That such
a goal is possible arises from a fundamental quantum
mechanical principle: Eve cannot tap the Alice-to-Bob
channel without creating a disturbance on that channel.
In this Letter we will introduce a new paradigm for se-
cure communication using quantum resources. Although
it can be used to generate a secret key, as in existing
QKD systems, the enormous disparity between the bit
error probabilities of a passive eavesdropper and the in-
tended receiver make this scheme attractive for direct in-
formation transmission. The basis for this new approach
is quantum illumination, specifically the Gaussian-state
radar system described in [5]. There, the entangled signal
and idler outputs from spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) were shown to afford a substantial
error probability advantage—over a coherent-state sys-
tem of the same average transmitted photon number—
when the signal beam is used to irradiate a target re-
gion containing a bright thermal-noise bath in which a
low-reflectivity object might be embedded, and the idler
beam is retained at the transmitter for use in an opti-
mal joint measurement with the light returned from the
target region. This performance advantage is surprising,
because the loss and noise combine to destroy any entan-
glement between the return light and the retained idler.
The origin of this advantage is the stronger-than-classical
phase-sensitive cross correlation between the signal and
idler produced by SPDC. When the source is operated in
the low-brightness regime, this leads to a phase-sensitive
cross correlation between the target return and the re-
tained idler that outstrips any such correlation produced
by a classical-state transmitter of the same average trans-
mitted photon number [5]. Here, we will turn that capa-
bility to the task of secure communication between Alice
and Bob, despite the presence of a passive eavesdropper
Eve.
The communication system of interest functions as fol-
lows. Alice uses SPDC to produce M signal-idler mode
pairs, with annihilation operators { aˆSm , aˆIm : 1 ≤ m ≤
M }, whose joint density operator ρˆSI is the tensor prod-
uct of independent, identically distributed (iid) density
operators for each mode pair that are zero-mean, jointly
Gaussian states with the common Wigner-distribution
covariance matrix
ΛSI =
1
4


S 0 Cq 0
0 S 0 −Cq
Cq 0 S 0
0 −Cq 0 S

 , (1)
where S ≡ 2NS + 1 and Cq ≡ 2
√
NS(NS + 1), and NS
is the average photon number of each signal (and idler)
mode [6]. Alice sends her signal modes to Bob, retaining
her idler modes for later use. Alice-to-Bob transmission
occurs over a pure-loss channel [7], so that Bob receives
modes whose annihilation operators are
aˆBm =
√
κ aˆSm +
√
1− κ eˆBm , for 1 ≤ m ≤M , (2)
where the environmental modes, {eˆBm}, are in their vac-
uum states [8]. Bob first imposes an identical, binary
phase-shift keyed (BPSK) information bit (k = 0 or 1)
on each aˆBm , yielding (−1)kaˆBm . He then adds iid, zero-
mean, isotropic, classical Gaussian noise, nBm , of vari-
anceNB to each (−1)kaˆBm , and transmits the noisy mod-
ulated modes, aˆ′Bm ≡ (−1)kaˆBm + nBm , back to Alice.
After propagation through the same pure-loss channel,
Alice receives modes whose annihilation operators are
aˆRm =
√
κ aˆ′Bm +
√
1− κ eˆAm , for 1 ≤ m ≤M, (3)
where the {eˆAm} are in their vacuum states. Given Bob’s
information bit k, we have that ρˆ
(k)
RI , the joint state of
2Alice’s {aˆRm , aˆIm} modes, is the tensor product of iid,
zero-mean, jointly Gaussian states for each mode pair
with the common Wigner-distribution covariance matrix
Λ
(k)
RI =
1
4


A 0 (−1)kCa 0
0 A 0 (−1)k+1Ca
(−1)kCa 0 S 0
0 (−1)k+1Ca 0 S

, (4)
where A ≡ 2κ2NS + 2κNB + 1 and Ca ≡ κCq. Alice’s
task is to decode Bob’s bit, which is equally likely to be
k = 0 or k = 1, with minimum error probability.
Eve will be assumed to collect all the photons that
are lost en route from Alice to Bob and from Bob to
Alice [10], i.e., she has at her disposal the mode pairs
{ cˆSm , cˆRm : 1 ≤ m ≤M }, where
cˆSm =
√
1− κ aˆSm −
√
κ eˆBm , (5)
cˆRm =
√
1− κ aˆ′Bm −
√
κ eˆAm . (6)
Given Bob’s bit value, Eve’s joint density operator,
ρˆ
(k)
cScR , is the tensor product of M iid mode-pair den-
sity operators that are zero-mean, jointly Gaussian states
with the common Wigner-distribution covariance matrix
Λ
(k)
cScR =
1
4


D 0 (−1)kCe 0
0 D 0 (−1)kCe
(−1)kCe 0 E 0
0 (−1)kCe 0 E

,
(7)
where D ≡ 2(1 − κ)NS + 1, Ce ≡ 2(1 − κ)
√
κNS , and
E ≡ 2(1−κ)κNS+2(1−κ)NB+1. Eve too is interested
in minimum error-probability decoding of Bob’s bit.
Alice’s minimum error probability decision rule is
to measure ρˆ
(1)
SI − ρˆ(0)SI , and declare that k = 1 was
sent if and only if her measurement outcome is non-
negative. Similarly, Eve’s minimum error probabil-
ity decision rule is to measure ρˆ(1)cScR − ρˆ(0)cScR and de-
clare that k = 1 was sent if and only if her measure-
ment outcome is non-negative. As noted for the quan-
tum illumination radar problem treated in [5], the ex-
act error probabilities for these Gaussian-state hypoth-
esis tests are not easy to evaluate. Thus, as in [5],
we shall rely on quantum Chernoff bounds [11], which
are known to be exponentially tight for iid M mode-
pair problems, i.e., with Pr(e) ≤ e−M max0≤s≤1 E(s)/2,
for E(s) ≡ − ln
(
tr[(ρˆ
(0)
m )s(ρˆ
(1)
m )1−s]
)
, giving the Chernoff
bound (in terms of the conditional mode-pair density op-
erators ρˆ
(k)
m ) on the exact error probability, we have
lim
M→∞
ln[2 Pr(e)]/M = max
0≤s≤1
E(s). (8)
The BPSK symmetry in ρˆ
(k)
SI and ρˆ
(k)
cScR implies that s =
1/2 optimizes the Chernoff bound exponents for both
Alice and Eve. The following lower bound on the error
probability of any receiver [5] will also be of use:
Pr(e) ≥ 1−
√
1− e−2ME(1/2)
2
; (9)
it is not exponentially tight for the problems at hand.
Because all our conditional density operators are zero-
mean Gaussian states, we can use the results of [12] to
evaluate E(1/2) for Alice and Eve’s receivers. To do so we
need the symplectic diagonalizations of their conditional
Wigner-distribution covariance matrices. The symplectic
diagonalization of a 4× 4 dimensional covariance matrix
Λ consists of a 4 × 4 dimensional symplectic matrix S
and a symplectic spectrum { νn : 1 ≤ n ≤ 2 } that satisfy
SΩST = Ω ≡


0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 −1 0

 (10)
Λ = S diag(ν1, ν1, ν2, ν2)S
T , (11)
where diag(·, ·, ·, ·) denotes a diagonal matrix with the
given diagonal elements.
For our quantum-illumination (Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice)
communication, the symplectic matrices needed for the
diagonalization of Λ
(k)
RI are
S(k) =
[
X+ (−1)kX−
(−1)kX− X+
]
, (12)
for k = 0, 1. Here, X± ≡ diag(x±,±x±) with
x± ≡
√
A+ S ±
√
(A+ S)2 − 4C2a
2
√
(A+ S)2 − 4C2a
. (13)
The associated symplectic spectra are identical for k = 0
and 1, i.e., for n = 1, 2 we have
ν(k)n =
[
(−1)n(S −A) +
√
(A+ S)2 − 4C2a
]
/8. (14)
For Eve’s attempt to listen in, the symplectic matrices
needed for the diagonalization of Λ(k)cScR are
S(k) =
[
Y (−1)k+1Z
(−1)kZ Y
]
, (15)
for k = 0, 1. Here, Y ≡ diag(cos(θ), cos(θ)) and Z ≡
diag(sin(θ), sin(θ)) with
cos(2θ) =
D − E√
(D − E)2 + 4C2e
. (16)
The associated symplectic spectra are identical for k = 0
and 1, i.e., for n = 1, 2 we have
ν(k)n =
[
(D + E)− (−1)n
√
(D − E)2 + 4C2e
]
/8. (17)
3The preceding diagonalizations lead to Chernoff bound
expressions that are far too long to exhibit here. In Fig. 1
we compare the Chernoff bounds for Alice and Eve’s op-
timum quantum receivers when κ = 0.1, NS = 0.004,
and NB = 100. Also included in this figure is the
error-probability lower bound from (9) on Eve’s optimum
quantum receiver. We see that Alice’s error probability
upper bound—at a givenM value—can be orders of mag-
nitude lower than the Eve’s error probability lower bound
when both use optimum quantum reception. This occurs
despite Eve’s getting 9 times more of Alice’s transmission
than Bob does and 9 times more of Bob’s transmission
than Alice does. Note that Alice’s performance advan-
tage may be better assessed from comparing her error-
probability upper bound with that of Eve’s receiver, in
that both are exponentially tight Chernoff bounds.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Error-probability bounds versus M ,
the number of SPDC mode pairs, assuming NS = 0.004,
κ = 0.1, and NB = 100. Solid curves: Chernoff bounds
for Alice and Eve’s optimum quantum receivers. Long-dashed
curve: error-probability lower bound for Eve’s optimum quan-
tum receiver. Dot-dashed curve: Chernoff bound for Al-
ice’s homodyne receiver. Short-dashed curve: Bhattacharyya
bound for Alice’s optical parametric amplifier (OPA) receiver.
To show that the advantage afforded by quantum illu-
mination extends well beyond the specific example chosen
for Fig. 1, we have used an algebraic computation pro-
gram to obtain the following approximate forms for the
Chernoff bounds on the error probabilities of Alice and
Eve’s optimum quantum receivers:
Pr(e)Alice ≤ exp(−4MκNS/NB)
2
(18)
Pr(e)Eve ≤ exp(−4Mκ(1− κ)N
2
S/NB)
2
, (19)
which apply in the low-brightness, high-noise regime,
viz., when NS ≪ 1 and κNB ≫ 1. We see that Alice’s
Chernoff bound error exponent will be orders of magni-
tude higher than that of Eve in this regime, because
EAlice(1/2)/EEve(1/2) = 1/(1− κ)Ns ≫ 1. (20)
Thus the advantageous quantum illumination behavior
shown in Fig. 1 is typical for this regime.
As yet we have not identified specific implementations
for Alice or Eve’s optimum quantum receivers. So, while
we will accord Eve the right to an optimum quantum
receiver, let us show that Alice can still enjoy an enor-
mous advantage in error probability when she uses opti-
cal homodyne detection [13] to measure {Re(aˆRm) : 1 ≤
m ≤ M } and {Re(aˆIm) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }. Conditioned
on Bob’s information bit, these homodyne measurements
yieldM iid pairs of zero mean, real-valued, jointly Gaus-
sian random variables with common covariance matrix
Λ
(k)
hom =
1
4
[
A (−1)kCa
(−1)kCa S
]
(21)
Using the classical Chernoff bound [14], we then find that
Pr(e)hom ≤ exp(−MκNS/NB)
2
, (22)
is an exponentially-tight upper bound on the Al-
ice’s homodyne-reception error probability in the low-
brightness, high-noise regime. Comparing (22) with (18)
we see that 6 dB of error exponent has been lost by re-
treating from optimum quantum reception to homodyne
detection. A more effective receiver implementation can
be developed from Guha’s optical parametric amplifier
(OPA) receiver for the quantum-illumination radar [15].
Here Alice uses an OPA to obtain modes given by
aˆ′m ≡
√
G aˆIm +
√
G− 1 aˆ†Rm , for 1 ≤ m ≤M , (23)
where G = 1 + NS/
√
κNB, and then makes a mini-
mum error-probability decision based on the results of the
photon-counting measurement
∑M
m=1 aˆ
′†
maˆ
′
m. The Bhat-
tacharyya bound [16] on this receiver’s error probability
in the NS ≪ 1, κNB ≫ 1 regime turns out to be
Pr(e)OPA ≤ exp(−2MκNS/NB)
2
, (24)
which is only 3 dB inferior, in error exponent, to Al-
ice’s optimum quantum receiver. We have included
the numerically-evaluated error probability bounds for
Alice’s homodyne (Chernoff bound) and OPA (Bhat-
tacharyya bound) receivers in Fig. 1, for the case κ = 0.1,
NS = 0.004, and NB = 100.
We have demonstrated that quantum illumination of-
fers a new approach to secure communication in the lossy
(κ ≪ 1), noisy (κNB ≫ 1), low-brightness (NS ≪ 1)
regime. In Fig. 2 we show that high noise and low
brightness are essential to this communication scheme
by comparing the Chernoff bounds for Alice and Eve’s
optimum quantum receivers when κ = 0.1, NS = 0.004,
and NB = 0, and when κ = 0.1, NS = 10, and NB = 100.
In the former situation, quantum-illumination reception
performs worse than eavesdropping, because of Eve’s col-
lecting the lion’s share of the photons sent by Alice and
4by Bob. In the latter case, quantum-illumination re-
ception is almost equivalent to eavesdropping, because
the phase-sensitive cross-correlation from high-brightness
SPDC is only slightly stronger than the classical limit.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Chernoff bounds versusM , the number
of SPDC mode pairs, for the no-noise and high-brightness
regimes. Optimum quantum reception and κ = 0.1 is assumed
for Alice (dashed curves) and Eve (solid curves).
Some final points are worth noting. BPSK communica-
tion is intrinsically phase sensitive, so Alice’s receiver will
require phase coherence that must be established through
a tracking system. Quantum-illumination secure com-
munication will require authentication, lest Eve insert
herself between Alice and Bob—in a man-in-the-middle
attack—pretending to be Bob to Alice and Alice to Bob.
Authentication might be carried out over a classical opti-
cal communication link, as is done in QKD systems, and
could be augmented by checks on the physical integrity
of the Alice-to-Bob connection, e.g., using optical time-
domain reflectometry on a fiber link. Finally, there is
the path-length versus bit-rate tradeoff. Operation must
occur in the low-brightness regime. So, as channel loss in-
creases (κ decreases), Alice must increase her mode-pair
number M at constant NS to maintain a sufficiently low
error probability and communication security. If she uses
T -sec-long time intervals for each bit, i.e., a bit rate of
R = 1/T , with an SPDC source of W Hz phase-matching
bandwidth, then M =WT [17] implies that her bit rate
will go down as loss increases and error probability is
held constant. For the case shown in Fig. 1, we note that
a 1THz phase-matching bandwidth and 2µs bit dura-
tion will yield highly-secure 500kbit/s communication—
Pr(e)OPA ≤ 7.15× 10−6 and 0.285 ≤ Pr(e)Eve ≤ 0.451—
with M =WT = 2× 106 when Alice and Bob are linked
by 50 km of 0.2 dB/km loss fiber, assuming that the rest
of their equipment is ideal.
In conclusion, quantum illumination can provide com-
munication that is secure against passive eavesdropping
in an entanglement-destroying environment. Additional
steps will be needed to defeat active attacks, in which
Eve uses her own light to probe Bob’s phase modulator.
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